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ABSTRACT
Mobile sources contribute large percentages of each pollutant, but technology is not yet
available to measure and tax emissions from each vehicle. We build a behavioral model of household
choices about vehicles and miles traveled. The ideal-but-unavailable emissions tax would encourage
drivers to abate emissions through many behaviors, some of which involve market transactions that
can be observed for feasible market incentives (such as a gas tax, subsidy to new cars, or tax by
vehicle type). Our model can calculate behavioral effects of each such price and thus calculate car
choices, miles, and emissions.
A nested logit structure is used to model discrete choices among different vehicle bundles.
We also consider continuous choices of miles driven and the age of each vehicle. We propose a
consistent estimation method for both discrete and continuous demands in one step, to capture the
















gan@eco.utexas.eduThe standard case for market-based incentives requires a tax or price on each unit 
of emissions.  Each form of abatement is then pursued until the marginal cost of reducing 
pollution matches the tax per unit of pollution, and the resulting combination of abatement 
technologies minimizes social costs (Pigou, 1920).  For vehicles, a tax on emissions could 
induce drivers to: (1) buy a newer, cleaner car, (2) buy a smaller, more fuel efficient car, 
(3) fix their broken pollution control equipment, (4) buy cleaner gasoline, (5) drive less, (6) 
drive  less  aggressively,  and  (7)  avoid  cold  start-ups.
1   Moreover,  economic  efficiency 
requires different combinations of these methods for different consumers: some lose little 
by switching to a smaller car, some could easily walk, and some just pay the tax.  
Yet the technology is not available to measure each car’s emissions in a reliable 
and cost-effective manner.  On-board diagnostic equipment is imperfect, and it is costly to 
retrofit millions of vehicles (Harrington and McConnell, 2003).  Remote sensing is less 
expensive and has been used to identify high-polluting vehicles, but it cannot measure 
emissions clearly enough to tax each car.
2  Moreover, vehicle emissions are important.  In 
2001, vehicles in the U.S. contributed 27 percent of volatile organic compounds (VOC), 37 
percent of nitrogen oxides (NOx), and 66 percent of carbon monoxide (CO) emissions.
3   
For these reasons, vehicle emission policies have relied almost solely on mandates: 
refineries must make clean gasoline, and new cars must meet required emission standards.
4  
These command and control (CAC) policies miss the opportunity to reduce social costs by 
harnessing  individual  incentives,  however,  as  the  mandated  combination  of  abatement 
methods is unlikely to match the combination that households would choose if faced with a 
tax on emissions.  In fact, the cost of abatement using such mandates can be several times 
the minimum cost achieved by using an emissions tax (Newell and Stavins, 2003).   
While the inability to measure emissions may preclude a vehicle emissions tax, it 
does not preclude any use of incentives.  Those who sell new or used cars or light-trucks 
                                                            
1 Heeb et al (2003) find that cold start emissions rates (in g/km traveled) exceed stabilized emissions rates by 
a factor of two to five, depending on the pollutant. Sierra Research (1994) finds that a car driven aggressively 
has carbon monoxide emissions that are almost 20 times higher than when driven normally. 
2 See Sierra Research (1994). Remote sensing in Texas (http://www.tnrcc.state.tx.us/air/ms/vim.html#im3) 
and Albuquerque NM (http://www.cabq.gov/aircare/rst.html) is used in 2005 to identify polluting vehicles. 
3  See  http://www.bts.gov/publications/transportation_statistics_annual_report/2004/.    We  focus  on  local 
pollutants, where emission rates depend on car characteristics.  In contrast, CO2 is linked directly to gas use. 
4 In the U.S., new cars face emission standards of .254 grams/km of HC’s, 2.11 grams/km of CO, and .248 
grams/km of NOx.  Light trucks face a variety of weaker standards, but all are scheduled to become more 
stringent.  These figures pertain to a test in the U.S. with a cold start-up phase, a transient phase at different 
speeds, and a hot start phase, for a total distance of 18 km at an average speed of 34 km/h.   -2- 
can collect tax on vehicle characteristics that are associated with emissions, or provide 
subsidy for vehicles with low emissions.  Most states charge annual registration fees that 
can be made to depend on vehicle characteristics.  Such policies might reduce emission 
rates, while changes in the gasoline tax can reduce miles driven.
5 
What vehicle characteristics or behaviors should be targeted by a tax or subsidy?  
How would consumers react to those new incentive instruments?  How much would each 
tax reduce emissions?  To address these questions, we build a general purpose model of 
discrete choices by households about how many cars to own and what types of cars to own, 
plus continuous choices about how far to drive.  In our model, we embrace individual 
heterogeneity.    We  estimate  all  decisions  simultaneously,  and  we  use  the  estimated 
parameters to predict the effects of certain price changes on choices and on emissions.   
Several existing papers explore market incentives that could be used in place of a 
tax on emissions.
6 In addition, several papers estimate models of the discrete choice among 
vehicle bundles (including number, size, and age categories).
7  Some models estimate the 
demand for gasoline or for vehicle miles traveled (VMT) as functions of price and income 
(as reviewed in Harrington and McConnell, 2003).  As well, we note that other models 
predict  emissions.
8   A  major  contribution  of  our  research,  then,  is  to  include  all  such 
choices simultaneously.  In general, we capture the effect of any price change on each 
household’s choices about the number of vehicles to buy, the type and age of each, the 
consequent emissions rates, miles driven, and the consequent total emissions.   
In a two-step procedure, Dubin and McFadden (1984) estimate a discrete choice 
model (for household appliances) and use the predicted shares to correct for endogeneity in 
the estimation of a continuous choice (usage hours).   Others extend this model to the 
discrete choice among vehicle bundles and a continuous choice of miles (e.g. Goldberg, 
1998, and West, 2004).  Yet, a single set of parameters appear both in the indirect utility 
                                                            
5 A new higher gas tax may be politically unlikely, yet it is still worth studying to know its power as an 
emissions-reduction tool.  And even if governments are unlikely to use tax dollars to pay for the various 
subsidies we study here, these incentives might instead be provided to drivers by private companies that want 
to purchase “offsets” – reductions in vehicle emissions to offset their increases from stationary sources.  For 
all of these reasons, we find it important to study specific incentives to drivers.  
6 For examples, see Eskeland and Devarajan (1996), Innes (1996), Kohn (1996), Train et al (1997), Plaut 
(1998), Sevigny (1998), and Fullerton and West (2000, 2002). 
7 See McFadden (1979), Mannering and Winston (1985), Train (1986), Brownstone et al (1996), Goldberg 
(1998), Brownstone and Train (1999), West (2004), and other papers reviewed in McFadden (2001). 
8 For example, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (U.S. EPA, 1998, p.3-68) discusses the use of 
EPA’s MOBILE5a model or California’s EMFAC7F model.   -3- 
function  used  to  estimate  discrete  choices  and  in  continuous  demands.    Using  this 
sequential  procedure,  the  estimated  parameters  of  the  continuous  demand  are  not 
constrained to match the same parameters in the estimated discrete choice model.   
Relative to this literature, we make a number of contributions.  First, we capture the 
simultaneity of these decisions by proposing a method for consistent estimation of both 
discrete and continuous choices in one step, yielding a single set of parameters.  In other 
words,  whereas  the  Dubin-McFadden  method  corrects  for  selection  of  vehicle  on  the 
choice of miles, our simultaneous procedure also allows for heterogeneity in actual fuel 
demand to affect the choice of vehicle.
9  Second, we allow for two continuous choices of 
miles – in each vehicle of a two-vehicle household.  These choices are bundle-specific.
10  
Third, we allow for an additional continuous choice of the age of each vehicle.  Fourth, we 
use the estimated parameters not only to predict changes in choices about vehicles and 
miles, but also how those choices affect emissions.
11 
For several reasons, we deviate from discrete vehicle types used in prior literature 
(including age and size categories).  First, we have no need to model the choice among 
hundreds of vehicle types, as in prior studies of manufacturer product differentiation, since 
all cars in a given year are made to a single emission rate standard.  Second, a different, 
weaker  emission  standard  has  applied  to  “sports  utility  vehicles”  (SUV,  for  short,  but 
defined here to include all light trucks and vans).  Emission rules for new vehicles do not 
depend on engine size.  We therefore model the choice between car and SUV, rather than 
engine  size.    Even  for  older  vehicles,  when  we  use  data  described  below  in  separate 
regressions for cars and SUV’s, we find that engine size is not an important determinant of 
emission rates. Third, those regressions find that vehicle age is very important for emission 
rates.  We wish not to lose information by aggregation into finite age categories (e.g. new 
                                                            
9 Hanemann (1984) proposes a method to estimate these demands simultaneously, but his method does not 
consider unobserved individual heterogeneity – a  key  factor in the  Dubin-McFadden  model. Our  model 
captures the individual unobserved heterogeneity.  Bento et al (2005) and Bhat (2005) are also working on 
models with simultaneous discrete and continuous choices. 
10 With a higher price of gas, some households might drive fewer miles in their SUV and more in their car.  
We do not estimate separately the miles in each vehicle, but we do estimate a change for the (Car, SUV) 
bundle that can differ from the (Car, Car) bundle.  Other papers have estimated substitution between vehicles 
within the family, but they treat the vehicles as given rather than chosen.  Greene and Hu (1985) find that this 
kind of substitution occurs to a large extent in some households, while Sevigny (1998) finds small effects.   
11 Our household responses represent market outcomes only if supply curves were horizontal.  The simulation 
of a change in the price of getting a car that is one year newer can be interpreted as a new local tax or subsidy 
in a small open jurisdiction that can import more of those newer cars at a constant price.  However, our 
demand system could be combined with some other estimates of supply to calculate equilibrium outcomes.    -4- 
vs. old).  Age is a  continuous variable,  and the choice of vehicle age is a continuous 
demand that affects emissions.
12  If a household in our model chooses to own two vehicles, 
then it has four continuous choices: age of each vehicle and miles to drive each vehicle.
13 
Age is normally measured in years, of course, but our model requires a price that 
does not depend on the amount demanded.  The price of age is not linear, because owning 
a brand-new car costs more depreciation per year than owning an old car.   Instead of using 
age  in  years,  we  therefore  construct  a  continuous  choice  variable  called  “Wear”  that 
measures the fraction of the vehicle that has depreciated (between 0 and 1).  A constant 
rate of depreciation means that  Wear  is a nonlinear function of age, but then the price per 
unit of  Wear  does not depend on its amount.  This constant price is estimated for each 
vehicle type using hedonic price regressions below.  Next, in order to separate this choice 
of vehicle attribute from the choice of vehicle, we assume that the discrete choice is about 
a brand-new “concept vehicle.”  Then the household gets reimbursed by the price of  Wear  
for accepting an older car.  In other words, in our model, a household makes simultaneous 
decisions about which concept vehicles, how old, and miles to drive. 
As  it  turns  out,  results  for  all  continuous  demands  are  broadly  similar  for  the 
sequential  and  simultaneous  models.    For  discrete  choices,  however,  our  simultaneous 
model finds substantially larger effects from a change in the gas price per mile, income, or 
vehicle-specific costs.  Signs of some elasticities are reversed.  In other words, household-
specific heterogeneity does affect discrete choices.   
The next section describes a behavioral choice model for one-vehicle households 
and  then  extends  it  to  consider  two-vehicle  bundles.    It  also  presents  a  new  method 
designed for jointly estimating all discrete and continuous choices.  Section II describes 
data sources and provides summary statistics, while III provides estimation results for both 
discrete and continuous demands.  Section IV compares elasticities, and V concludes.  
I. The Model and Estimation 
In our model, an agent representing each household faces a discrete choice among 
a finite number of vehicle bundles.  The nesting structure is shown in Figure 1.  One 
                                                            
12 Older vehicles have higher emissions both because older vintages were produced to weaker standards and 
because pollution control equipment deteriorates with age.  Panel data would be required to distinguish these. 
13 Fullerton and West (2000) also simulate effects of incentives in a model of heterogeneous households’ 
continuous choices of car size, car age, and  VMT,  but they use calibrated rather than estimated parameters.  
That model avoids discrete choices, but it considers only one car per agent.  In our model, we estimate 
discrete choices to consider the household’s number of vehicles.    -5- 
choice is the number of vehicles (0, 1, or 2), and another choice for each vehicle is the 
type of vehicle (a car or an SUV).  We thus have six final bundles, as shown in the figure 
and listed in Table 1.  Other choices important for emissions of each vehicle are the 
continuous  choice  about  vehicle  miles traveled  (VMT)  and  vehicle  age.    To  obtain a 
choice variable with a linear price, we construct “Wear”  as the fraction of the vehicle 
used up by depreciation.  It is calculated for each car in our sample by assuming 20% 
depreciation per year, so  Wear = 1 – (1 – 0.2)
age.  Thus, a new car has  Wear = 0. 
   
Figure 1: Nesting Structure for Choice among Vehicle Bundles 
 
Then, since choice of age is considered separately, each discrete vehicle bundle 
must be defined in a way that is independent of age.  For this reason, we define each 
“concept” vehicle as a bundle of attributes of a brand-new vehicle (car or SUV).  The 
household must pay the price of that brand-new vehicle (the “capital cost”), but then it gets 
back some money for accepting Wear on that vehicle (the “reimbursement” price of Wear). 
Our  demand  system  now  has  several  distinguishing  characteristics.    First,  it 
incorporates all of these discrete and continuous choices simultaneously.  Second, some 
unobserved characteristics might affect both kinds of choices.  For example, an agent 
who lives far from work may drive more and thus prefer a larger, more comfortable car.  
Yet, a more comfortable car may increase the satisfaction of driving and thus induce the 
driver to drive more.  Third, many households have two cars with multiple continuous 
choices.  Consequently, the substitution structure in  VMT  and  Wear  among different 
vehicles is important in order to understand the effects of policy on driving behavior.   -6- 
Since  the  discrete  choice  in  Dubin  and  McFadden  (1984)  involves  only  two 
alternatives,  that  paper  can  use  a  simple  logit  model.    Our  model  has  six  choices, 
however, and so we require a more general logit structure.  We use the nested logit.  The 
next sub-section describes the simple case for households with only one vehicle, and the 
second  subsection  considers  multi-vehicle  households.    In  the  third  and  fourth  sub-
sections, we discuss the estimation procedure and elasticity calculations. 
A. Our Model of Car Choice and Miles Driven 
This description starts with the choices of  VMT  and  Wear,  assuming that a one-
car household has already chosen vehicle number-and-type bundle  i.  Given bundle  i,  an 
agent’s direct utility is a function of  VMT,  Wear,  and another consumption good  c.  That 
is,   ) , , ( i i i c Wear VMT U U = .  Given income  y,  the budget constraint is given by: 
i i i i i
i
g r y c Wear q VMT
MPG
p
- = + - ,                     (1) 
where  pg  is the price of gasoline (in dollars per gallon), and  MPGi  is fuel efficiency (in 
miles per gallon), so that  pi º  pg/MPGi  is the marginal price per mile in the  i
th  vehicle 
bundle.   The “reimbursement” price of  Wear  for vehicle type  i  is denoted as  qi.  The 
price of the other consumption good is normalized to be 1.  The annualized capital cost of 
the concept-vehicle bundle is  ri.  Thus, gasoline is the only cost per mile, whereas capital 
cost is a fixed cost of each bundle.
14  The indirect utility for bundle  i  is a function of 
household income and prices, denoted as  V(y-ri, pi, qi,). 
One common way to obtain the indirect utility function is to use parametric demand 
and then solve a system of partial differential equations using Roy’s identity (Hausman, 
1981).    For  comparability  with  other  studies,  we  want    VMT    demand  as  a  log-linear 
function of the price per mile  pi,  available income  y – ri,  and a vector of observed socio-
demographic variables  x.  We then add the reimbursement price  qi  to that equation to get:   




V i ,                 (2)   
where  h  represents an agent-specific unobserved factor (see below).  Also, we assume 
    ri = (￿+￿)ki,                             (3) 
                                                            
14 Time variation in gasoline prices may cause time variation in used vehicle prices.  Our use of cross-section 
data helps avoid this problem.   -7- 
where  ki  is the total capital value of bundle  i  (depreciated or market value),  d  is the 
annual rate of further depreciation in value, and  ￿  represents the interest and maintenance 
cost.  When we plug (3) into (2) and integrate, the implied indirect utility is: 














1 0 ,                     (4) 
where  ￿1 = ￿(￿+￿).
15  This equation includes an extra additive error  ei  that is bundle-
specific.  As in the usual discrete choice model, this error term represents the difference 
between  true  individual  utility  at  choice    i    and  the  calculated  utility  level.
16   For 
households who choose the no-vehicle bundle #6, continuous variables such as  pi,  qi,  and  
VMTi  are unobservable.  Implicitly, we assume that these households may purchase a 
bicycle or a fare card for public transportation with a fixed fee, similar to the capital cost ki.  
With no cost per mile or of Wear, their second exponential term in (4) is 1.0.  Their capital 
cost  ki  is unobserved, so  i k 1 b  and 
6
0 ￿  are not separately identifiable.  Since we allow for a 
choice-specific intercept, however, we combine both terms into one constant, 
6
0 ￿ . 
  Note that the simple addition of   i qq a  to equation (2) dictates the form of indirect 
utility in (4).  This indirect utility then implies specific forms for both demands:
17 




V i                (5a)  






W i            (5b)    
This  specification  has  pros  and  cons.    One  limitation  is  the  use  of  specific 
functional forms, but these log-linear forms are comparable to prior literature and allow 
for two different demand functions (5a,b) that are consistent with a single indirect utility 
function (4).  An advantage of this specification is that it allows the price of  Wear  (qi)  
to enter the  VMT  demand, and price of  VMT  (pi) to enter the  Wear  demand, but a 
                                                            
15 Our model provides estimates of  ￿  and  ￿1,  and these can be used to calculate (￿+￿), but we do not 
provide separate estimates of  ￿  and  ￿.  Some of our steps below require an assumption about  ￿,  and we use 
20 percent for this purpose.  Estimates of the depreciation rate for automobiles range from 33% (Jorgenson, 
1996) or 30% (Hulten and Wykoff, 1996) to 15%, the rate implicit in the vehicle depreciation schedule 
currently used by the Bureau of Economic Analysis.  We use 20% because it falls between these bounds. 
16 Also, because of this integration, note that the intercept in (4) may be different from the intercept in (2). 
17 More general demand functions such as translog demand or the almost ideal demand system imply much 
more complicated indirect utility functions that could not be estimated. Also, note that no-vehicle households 
have zero marginal prices, so they have constant miles traveled (conditioned on observed socio-demographic 
variables and total income).  Thus, no continuous demand equations are needed for these households.    -8- 
limitation is that the expression  ￿
i
ppi – ￿qqi  enters both demands the same way.
18  Also, 
both continuous demands have the same income effect,  ￿.  A more general model could 
not be estimated.  Note, however, that we have added generality where it matters most.  
In  particular,  the  price  per  mile  has  a  bundle-specific  coefficient  (￿
i
p),  to  allow  for 
different effects on the demand for miles in each type of vehicle.  Thus a gas tax might 
decrease miles in an SUV more than in a car, in a way that depends on fuel efficiency, 
and the change in miles of a two-car household can differ from the change in miles of a 
household with two SUV’s (or one car and one SUV).  
B.  Two-Vehicle Households 
So far, the model above considers only one vehicle, but many households have two 
vehicles and thus two continuous choices of miles and two continuous choices of  Wear.  
We have the observed  VMT  and  Wear  for each vehicle, so we can incorporate all four 
continuous choices.
19  The direct utility for a two-vehicle household choosing bundle  i  is  
U(VMTi1, VMTi2, Weari1, Weari2, ci).  The budget constraint is given by: 















,                (6) 
where  qij  are reimbursement prices for  Wear  in the two vehicles of bundle  i  (j = 1, 2).  
Also,  pij º  pg/MPGij  is the price per mile using the  j
th  car of bundle  i.  We consider the 
indirect utility function as follows: 
( ) ￿ x k ￿y ￿ V i
i
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   (7)  
The indirect utility in (7) is similar to (4) except for two extra terms related to the 
second vehicle’s gasoline price  pi2  and reimbursement price  qi2.  By Roy’s identity, given 
that the household has chosen bundle  i  in (7),  the four continuous demands are:                                                                                                                       






V i          (8a) 
                                                            
18 Thus, a change in  pi  must have the same effect on  Wear  that it has on miles.  We tried other models, 
including one where indirect utility has separate terms  exp(￿
i
ppi)  and  exp(￿qqi), so that  pi  would have no 
effect on  Wear,  and  qi  would have no effect on  VMT.  That model would not converge, and anyway it is 
restrictive by assuming no cross-price effects.  We also tried models with more coefficients, to relax these 
restrictions,  and  we  tried  many  starting  points,  but  only  the  model  in  (4)  and  (5)  could  be  estimated 
simultaneously for discrete and continuous choices (especially for two-vehicle bundles considered below).   
19 Another interesting question is about each household member’s choice of miles driven (in either car), but 
we have no such data.  As described below, we have only data on miles driven in each vehicle.   -9- 
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h g b b a a + + + - - - ' 1 2 2 1 1 x k y q q i i q i q          (8d) 
These demands generalize those of a one-vehicle household in (5) by including 
terms for  pi2  and  qi2  (and so we refer to (8) for “all” demands).  The demand for  VMTi2  
is symmetric to  VMTi1  in explanatory variables, but it is non-linear in parameters of both  
pi1  and  pi2.  The demands for  Wearij  ( j= 1, 2)  are similarly defined.  
C.  A Procedure to Estimate Discrete and Continuous Demands Simultaneously 
Note  that  the  same  parameters  appear  in  both  discrete  and  continuous  choice 
functions, yet previous literature has estimated these choice models separately.  Often the 
estimates for the same parameters are different not only in magnitude but also in sign.  In 
this sub-section, we propose a procedure for simultaneous estimation of bundle choice, 
vehicle age, and miles driven.  We start with separate discussion of car choice and miles 
driven, and then how we combine them in a single estimation procedure. 
Following McFadden’s random utility hypothesis, vehicle bundle  i  is chosen if 
and only if:  Vi ￿ Vj  for all  j ￿ i.  The unconditional expected share for bundle  i  then is: 
( ) h h h d f i j V V S j i i ￿ ¹ " > = ) | , Pr( ,                                                                       (9) 
where  Si  is the share choosing bundle  i,  and  f(￿)  is the probability density function of 
the agent-specific error  h.  We are now in a position to describe the importance of  h.  On 
the one hand, individual heterogeneity represented by  h  could directly affect the choice of 
bundle.  On the other hand, observed demands for  VMT  and  Wear  are conditional on 
that choice.  Since the choice of vehicle bundle is endogenous, the estimated demands for  
VMT  and  Wear  could be biased if the influence of  h  in (9) is ignored.  In the model of 
Dubin and McFadden (1984), the error term  ￿  can be cancelled out from the inequality 
{Vi>Vj, " j￿i}, which simplifies the calculation of probabilities (that is, the integration   -10- 
over    h    in  equation  (9)  is  not  necessary).    In  such  a  model,  h    appears  only  in  the 
continuous demands, so this individual heterogeneity does not affect the choice of vehicle 
bundle directly.  They can estimate the discrete model with error  ￿i  for each bundle, and 
then, given predicted bundle shares, they estimate the continuous choices with errors  h.   
Yet, our purpose here is to retain individual-specific heterogeneity h  and its effect 
on bundle choice.  Thus, the evaluation of probabilities in our model involves integration 
over all error components (￿, ￿), where  ￿ =(￿1, ￿2, … , ￿J), and where  J  is the number of 
possible vehicle bundles.  In our model, the  ￿i  are assumed to be distributed with a 
generalized extreme value (GEV) distribution, and  h  follows an unknown distribution 
with a zero mean across individuals.  Conditional on  h,  we integrate over the GEV 
distribution to obtain conditional choice probabilities as a general nested logit model: 
  ( ) ( ) ( )
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,                     (10) 
where  n  and  l  represent nests,  i  is an alternative within nest  n,  m  is an alternative 
within nest  l,  K is the total number of nests, and  Bl  (l = 1, …, K)  represents a nested 
subset of alternatives.  Our nesting structure is illustrated in Figure 1. 
We also integrate over the distribution of  h  to obtain unconditional probabilities.  
The literature offers no guidance on the distribution of the  ￿.
20  To reduce the numerical 
difficulty in estimation, we let  ￿  be uniformly distributed in the interval [-￿, ￿].  We 
search for the  ￿  that yields a likelihood function with the largest value.
21 
As pointed out by Dubin and McFadden (1984), the random error  ￿  does not have 
a zero mean conditional on each chosen bundle, due to the endogeneity of bundle choice.  
This can be seen clearly if we rewrite equations (8a-d) into a more convenient form for 
estimation (using just equation 8a, as an example):  
         
h g b b a a
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20 Dubin and McFadden (1984) assume  ￿  has a particular form of mean and variance, in order to derive an 
explicit conditional expectation.  
21 This search yields  ￿  equal to 0.65.  Since the estimation of the logit model requires integration over the 
individual heterogeneity term  ￿,  our model is a mixed logit model (McFadden and Train, 2000).   -11- 
where  dij  is a choice indicator variable equal to one when  i = j, and where equations 
(11b-d) are analogous.  The random error  h   is correlated with the choice indicators  dij.  
Dubin  and  McFadden  (1984)  suggest  sequential  estimation  to  solve  this  endogeneity 
problem  (a  procedure  later  adopted  by  Goldberg  (1998)  and  West  (2004)).    First,  the 
discrete choice model is estimated and the predicted probabilities are calculated.  They 
then suggest three alternative methods that yield consistent estimates of parameters for 
continuous  demands:  the  instrumental  variable  method  (IV),  the  reduced  form  method 
(RF), and the conditional expectation correction method (CE).  They derive the correction 
terms in terms of probabilities for the CE method based on the assumption of an  i.i.d.  
extreme value distribution of  ei.  However, since we assume a GEV distribution of  ei,  
these correction terms cannot be used in our model.  We want a method that can be used 
both for sequential estimation and for our simultaneous estimation, in order to compare 
them, and so we employ the RF method. Taking expectation of (11a) over  h,  we have: 
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where  Snj  is the probability of individual  n  choosing vehicle bundle  j  from (9),  un1  is 
an additional error to represent the difference between observed VMT  and predicted  VMT,  
and where (12b-d) are analogous (not shown here).  The sequential RF method applies 
least squares to (12a-d), except that the shares Snj are replaced by estimated shares  nj S ˆ  
from the discrete choice model.  In contrast, we estimate (9) and (12a-d) simultaneously. 
  Since the same parameters appear in both discrete and continuous choice functions, 
we propose a joint estimation method to capture this simultaneity.  In particular, we obtain 
a set of parameters that maximize the following objective function: 
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where  f1,  f2,  g1,  and  g2  represent the right hand sides (without the random error  un1) of 
the four equations (12a-d),  lnL  is the log likelihood function of the nested logit, and  ￿ 
represents the set of parameters to be estimated by maximizing equation (13).    -12- 
As  is  consistent  with  Dubin  and  McFadden  (1984)  and  other  papers  in  this 
literature, the maintained hypotheses are that the utility functional form is correct and that 
consumers  maximize  it.    Under  these  hypotheses,  our  procedure  produces  consistent 
estimates of parameters.  The reasoning is as follows: if the components of (13) were 
maximized separately, and if some single set of parameters were the solution to all those 
separate maximizations, then this set of parameters would also maximize the combined 
objective function.  To compare the results, we estimate our model by both the sequential 
method and the simultaneous estimation method.  
D.  Elasticities 
Once we obtain the parameter estimates, we are ready to calculate elasticities.  To 
see the marginal effects of prices on indirect utility, and therefore on bundle choice, we use 
equation (7) to obtain explicit formulas for those derivatives.  First, define   exp(￿) ￿ 
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and the marginal effects of income or capital cost on utility take similar forms: 
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Then we derive the elasticity of choice  i  with respect to a change in variable  zj 
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Since these formulas involve the unconditional probability of vehicle bundle  i, 
calculating each bundle elasticity requires integration over  ￿.  In contrast, calculations of  
VMT  elasticites do not involve integration over  ￿.  For bundle  i  (i = 1, …, 5), the own- 
and cross-price elasticities of  VMT  demand are calculated by:   -13- 
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The elasticities of demand for  Wear  with respect to its price have a similar form: 
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We can also calculate the income elasticity, given by: 

















) ln( 2 1 ,                                                                       (19) 
and the total capital cost elasticity, given by: 






















= .                                                                        (20) 
In equations (16) – (20), elasticities are typically evaluated at each bundle’s mean 
values of  y  and  k,  the bundle average of gas prices per mile (p1  and  p2) and the bundle 
average of reimbursement prices (q1  and  q2). 
II. Data and Summary Statistics 
In order to analyze household choice of vehicles, miles driven, and vehicle  Wear,  
we need micro-data on household characteristics, household income or expenditures, and 
detailed  information  about  household-owned  vehicles  such  as  the  number  of  vehicles, 
miles driven in each, and vehicle characteristics (including miles per gallon, MPG, and 
emissions per mile, EPM).  No single data set contains all such information. 
The  Consumer  Expenditure  Survey  (CEX)  provides  data  on  household  income, 
characteristics,  and  household-owned  vehicles.
22   For  each  household,  we  aggregate 
expenditures over four quarters, taking demographic data and detailed vehicle information 
from their last quarter in the survey.  We use the CEX from 1996 to 2000, supplemented 
with the corresponding OVB file (Owned Vehicles Part B Detailed questions).  This OVB 
file  includes  data  on  each  vehicle  type,  make,  year,  number  of  cylinders,  purchase 
expenses  and  financing,  time  since  purchase,  mileage,  gasoline  expenditure,  and  other 
information.  We keep only households that satisfy several criteria.  First, expenditures 
                                                            
22 The CEX data are collected by the Bureau of Labor Statistics of the U.S. Department of Labor through 
quarterly interviews of selected households throughout the U.S.  Each household is interviewed over five 
consecutive quarters.  Each quarter, 20% of households complete their last interview and are replaced by new 
households.  For CEX data, see http://elsa.berkeley.edu  or  http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/.   -14- 
must be reported consecutively for four quarters in the CEX of 1996-2000.  Second, the 
household must possess the same number of vehicles during these four quarters.  Third, we 
remove households that own more than two vehicles.
23  We also remove households that 
have vehicles other than automobiles or SUV’s (defined to include light trucks or vans).  
Finally, we are left with 9027 households, of which 2077 own no vehicles, 4211 own one 
vehicle, and 2739 own two vehicles.  We use yearly total expenditure as a proxy for yearly 
income of each household.  Table 2 defines all the variables used in estimations. 
Summary statistics are shown in Table 3 for major household characteristics by 
vehicle bundle.  This table shows significant variations in household characteristics across 
the number of vehicles and bundles.  For example, larger households especially with more 
kids have more vehicles and prefer SUVs.  Wealthier households (as measured by total 
yearly expenditures) possess more vehicles.  Households with more workers or income 
earners have more vehicles.  Households with male heads are inclined to have SUVs.    
Next, fuel price data are obtained from the ACCRA cost-of-living index for 1996-
2000.  This index compiles quarterly data for approximately 300 cities in the United States.  
It also lists average gasoline price for each city for each survey quarter.  Since the CEX 
reports region and state of residence instead of city for each household, we average the city 
gas prices to obtain a state price for each calendar quarter.  For those states reported in the 
CEX,  but  not  reported  in  the  ACCRA  index,  we  use  the  average  region  price  as  a 
substitute.  Then we assign a gas price to each CEX household based on the state of 
residence, CEX quarter, and year. 
Some of the variables in our model require calculations or additional sources of 
data.  We now describe these extra calculations. 
(1) Wear:  The vehicle’s age is derived by taking the year of the survey minus the 
year the vehicle was made.  We then assume 20% annual depreciation, and calculate  Wear  
as  the  percentage  of  the  vehicle’s  value  that  has  wasted  away  (given  all  the  vehicle 
characteristics unchanged except vehicle age).  Wear  ranges from zero for a new car, to  
Wear = 1  for a very old car.  Specifically,  Wear = 1 – (1 – 0.2)
age . 
          (2)  Capital  value  of  the  vehicle:    The  vehicle’s  year  of  purchase  and  reported 
purchase price (pp) are available in the OVB file, but we want an estimate of current 
                                                            
23 In the CEX of 1996-2000, 18.4% of households own more than two vehicles.  Some of these households 
may have a vehicle for business, whereas our model of household choice assumes utility maximization.   -15- 
market value (cmv).  We calculate the number of “years since purchase” (ysp), and we 
subtract depreciation for each year, again using 20% as the annual rate of depreciation. The 
formula is  cmv = pp´(1–0.2)
ysp.  We then estimate a simple hedonic price regression: 
) ( ) ( ) 1 ( 2 1 0 2 1 0 im Wear b cyl Wear b Wear b im a cyl a a cmv ´ + ´ + - + + + =             (21) 
where  a0  through  a2, and  b0  through  b2  are parameters.  The variable  cyl  denotes the 
number of cylinders, while  im  is a dummy variable indicating if the vehicle is imported.
24  
Wear  is included in the regression to capture the effects of vehicle age on market value.  
Using  a  sub-sample  of  the  CEX  that  has  all  necessary  variables,  we  run  separate 
regressions for cars and SUV’s and report the results in Table 4.  Then, for the value of 
each brand new “concept” vehicle (with  Wear = 0), we use:  
    0 2 1 0 ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ b im a cyl a a k + + + =    .                                                                 (22) 
where  0 ˆ a   through   2 ˆ a   and   0 ˆ b   are estimates of parameters in (21).   
(3) The price of  Wear:  First, we calculate the extra amount paid for a car with no 
wear on it (Wear = 0) compared to a very old car with the same characteristics (Wear = 1).  
From (21), that difference is  ( ) im b cyl b b 2 1 0 ˆ ˆ ˆ - - .  Then,  q  is the annual reimbursement 
price of  Wear, that is, the amount saved during a year by an owner who accepts one whole 
unit of  Wear (an old car instead of a new car).  Since a very old car does not depreciate 
any further, the amount saved is the depreciation during the year from holding a new car.  
Again assuming 20% depreciation, we have:  ( ) im b cyl b b q 2 1 0 ˆ ˆ ˆ 2 . 0 - - = . 
(4) Fuel Efficiency:  The EPA reports miles per gallon (MPG) of new vehicles, but 
we need it for vehicles of all ages.  The CEX does not contain this information, so we 
estimate MPG using data of the California Air Resources Board (CARB, 1997 and 2000).
25  
Their first sub-sample is “series 13”, from November 1995 to March 1997, in which the 
CARB tested a total of 345 passenger cars, light-duty trucks, and medium-duty vans.  The 
second sub-sample is “series 14”, from November 1997 to August 1999, which includes 
                                                            
24 The CEX does not include the vehicle’s nation of origin, so we create the im dummy using information on 
manufacturer and model.  We also tried other vehicle characteristics in the regression, such as indicators for 
automatic transmission, power steering, and air conditioning, but the estimates are not significant.  Inclusion 
of these variables does not raise adjusted  R
2 and can result in negative predictions of  cmv. 
25 For MPG of new cars, http://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/index.htm is a website of the US Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) and the Department of Energy.  The EPA also provides the historical fuel economy 
of new vehicles at http://www.epa.gov/otaq/mpg.htm or at http://www.epa.gov/otaq/tcldata.htm.    -16- 
332 vehicles (but which reports only 327 vehicles).  In total, we use 672 vehicles.  We 
regress MPG against vehicle characteristics in the CARB and then use those estimated 
coefficients to predict MPG for each vehicle in the CEX.  The estimation results are shown 
in Table 5, where a 4-cylinder SUV is the omitted category.  This table shows that fuel 
efficiency decreases with vehicle age and with engine size, both for cars and for SUV’s.  
Given the same vehicle age and engine size, MPG is higher for cars than for SUV’s. 
(5) Emissions per mile (EPM):  For the same sample of 672 used vehicles, the 
CARB tests for several pollutants.  Following Fullerton and West (2000), we weight each 
pollutant by estimates of its damages, with the highest weight on nitrous oxides (NOX, 
0.495), followed by hydrocarbons (HC, 0.405), and carbon monoxide (CO, 0.10).  Results 
appear in Table 5.  Cars pollute less than SUV’s because they were produced under stricter 
standards.    Older  vehicles  pollute  more,  both  because  newer  vintages  faced  stricter 
standards and because pollution control equipment deteriorates over time.
26 
(6) Vehicle Miles Traveled (VMT):  The OVB file provides cumulative miles on 
each vehicle, but we need yearly miles driven.  We had planned to match households 
across quarters, take the latest odometer reading minus the earliest one, divide by the 
number of quarters between readings, and multiply by four. Unfortunately, however, some 
later odometer readings are less than the earlier ones, and many readings are missing.  
Therefore, we propose a different procedure to get VMT.  For a one-car household, we take 
observed annual expenditure on gasoline, divide by the price per gallon to get number of 
gallons, and then multiply by MPG to get miles.  For a two-vehicle household, we only 
know the total gasoline expenditure, so we need to allocate it between the two vehicles.  
Only for this allocation do we use the difference in odometer readings between quarters.
27  
(7) Vehicle bundles:  As listed in Table 1, vehicle choices are classified into six 
categories according to the number and type of vehicles.  For bundle 4, with one car and 
one SUV, the car is always identified as the first vehicle.  For bundles 3 and 5, the first 
vehicle is identified as the one with higher yearly  VMT.  If two vehicles have the same 
                                                            
26 For vehicles in our sample, the calculated  EPM  is 1.89 grams/mile for the average car and 3.56 for the 
average SUV.  It also increases to 6.94 grams/mile for a very old vehicle (with Wear =1). 
27 If the difference in odometer readings is positive for both vehicles, then we divide it by MPG to obtain an 
estimate of each vehicle’s gas consumption.  Each gasoline amount divided by their sum gives shares, used 
to allocate the observed total gas consumption.  Each vehicle’s gallons divided by MPG yields  VMT.  If the 
difference in odometer readings is positive only for one vehicle, we use this figure as  VMT1  and calculate 
gasoline used in this vehicle.  Then total gasoline minus gas used in this vehicle is residual gas, allocated to 
the other vehicle.  Dividing this residual gas by MPG yields  VMT2.  If the difference in odometer readings is 
positive for neither vehicle, then we do imputations based on households with similar characteristics.    -17- 
yearly  VMT,  the identification is random.  If  VMT  is missing, then the vehicle with an 
earlier purchase year is taken as the first vehicle.  If the purchase year and miles-driven are 
both missing, the identification is random.  
III.  Estimation Results 
The  model  described  in  Section  I  is  estimated  by  both  the  sequential  and  the 
simultaneous  estimation  methods.    The  mean  values  of  key  variables  are  reported  by 
bundle in Table 6.  We average the values within each bundle for each bundle-specific 
variable except gas price per mile.  Gas price per mile is calculated by dividing gas price 
per gallon by a bundle-specific MPG listed in Table 1.  Thus, gas prices per mile vary both 
within and between bundles.  The presence of collinearity between the fixed effects  a0
i  (i 
= 1, …, 6)  and the bundle-specific variables such as  ki  (i = 1, …, 5)  forces us to 
normalize the fixed effect of bundle one  (
1
0 a )  to zero.  To facilitate the estimation, we 
also normalize  y  in units of 10,000 dollars,  ki  in units of 1,000, and  q1  and  q2  in units 
of 100 dollars.  Accordingly, we multiply  Wear1  and  Wear2  by 100 to keep the total 
amount of reimbursement unchanged in the budget constraint.   
Notice that bundle 3 and bundle 5 each contains two vehicles of the same type, 
while bundle 4 consists of one car and one SUV.  When the retail gas price increases, all 
gas prices per mile are affected in bundle-specific ways because MPG depends both on 
vehicle age and type (car or SUV).  As revealed by Table 1, MPG is more type-specific 
than bundle-specific.  Thus, we expect that the gas price parameters of car bundles 1 and 3 
are quite close to one another, as are those of SUV bundles 2 and 5.  For a household with 
one car and one SUV (bundle 4), however, we wish to allow more substitution.  In our 
estimation, we assign one parameter   1 C a   to the gas price of the only car in bundle 1 and 
first car in bundle 3 (and  2 C a   to the second car).  We assign one parameter   1 S a   to the 
only SUV in bundle 2 and first SUV of bundle 5 (and  2 S a  to the second SUV).  Then we 
assign two gas price parameters to bundle 4:  
4
1 p a (=
4
CAR a )  for the car and  
4
2 p a (=
4
SUV a )  
for the SUV.  Results from the sequential estimation are discussed first. 
  We follow the procedure suggested by Dubin and Mcfadden (1984), but at the first 
stage  we  estimate  a  nested  logit  structure  instead  of  a  multinomial  logit  model.    The 
traditional  ML  method  is  employed.    The  RF  method  is  adopted  at  the  second  stage 
because the correction terms derived by Dubin and Mcfadden are inappropriate for the   -18- 
GEV error structure.  In the second stage we estimate four continuous demand equations 
jointly  (only  two  equations  for  the  one-vehicle  bundles),  using  an  objective  function 
similar to equation (13) except that the last term is removed.  We constrain parameters to 
be constant across bundles except those for gas prices and constant terms.  The estimation 
results are reported in the first two columns of Table 7, under “sequential estimation”.  
For the discrete choice model in the first column of Table 7, the estimates of   1 C a  
and  1 S a  are significant at the 1% level, while those of  2 C a  and  2 S a  are not statistically 
significant.  The estimates of  
4
1 p a (=
4
CAR a )  and  
4
2 p a (=
4
SUV a )  are both significant at the 
0.01 level.  All of them are negative as expected.  The Wear coefficients  1 q a  and  2 q a  are 
also different from zero at the 0.01 level.  The parameter  ln (n = 1,2)  measures the degree 
of independence of the errors of alternatives in nest  n.  In our model, the estimates of  l1  
and  l2  are 0.814 and 0.066, respectively, both significant at the 0.01 level.
28   
Since all the estimates of   1 p a  and   2 p a  are negative, equations (14) indicate that 
the marginal effects of gas prices per mile are negative.  As consistent with expectation, an 
increase in gas price reduces household utility.  Since the coefficient on the reimbursement 
price  q1  is negative, the marginal effect on utility is positive as expected.  A higher 
reimbursement  price  means  more  money  back  to  the  household  for  accepting  a  given 
vehicle age or level of  Wear.  However, the coefficient on  q2  has unexpected sign.  Since 
estimates of  ￿  and  ￿1  are both negative and significant, equations (15) indicate that the 
marginal effect of capital cost is negative while that of income is positive.  
We then use those discrete choices from the first column to estimate the continuous 
demands shown in the second column.  A glance down the second column indicates that 
most of estimated coefficients are quite different from the corresponding estimates in the 
first column. Yet the parameters in the second column are the same parameters as in the 
first column, even from the same model, as the continuous demands are supposed to be 
consistent with a particular indirect utility function. For example, the estimated coefficient 
on income is −1.408 in the first column and +1.134 in the second column.  Both have small 
errors, and so they are significantly different from each other, even though they are the 
                                                            
28 If  ln "n  are within the range of zero to one, then “the model is consistent with utility maximization for all 
possible values of the explanatory variables” (Train, 2003, p.85).  Since our  ￿  are significantly less than one, 
the errors within each nest are correlated, evidence in favor of nesting rather than MNL.     -19- 
same parameter of the same model.  Many price coefficients also differ significantly in 
magnitude (and the two estimates of  ￿q2  differ in sign).   
  Next, the model is estimated by the simultaneous estimation procedure proposed in 
Section I.C.  The point of this procedure is to capture household-specific heterogeneity in 
both discrete and continuous choices.  The two types of choices are connected by the same 
parameters and the same random error term  h  appearing in both.
 29  In contrast, in the 
sequential procedure, the bundle choice affects continuous demands (and not vice versa).  
The simultaneous estimates are reported in the last column of Table 7. 
  All ten estimates of coefficients on key variables have the expected signs, and all 
but  two  are  significantly  different  from  zero.    Yet,  for  many  parameters,  the  estimate 
differs from both estimates obtained by sequential estimation.  For example, the capital 
cost coefficient (b1) from the simultaneous model (–0.405) is smaller in magnitude than 
either that of the logit model (–0.671) or the continuous demand model (–0.456).  The 
estimates of coefficients on demographic variables vary with the estimation method, not 
only in magnitude but also in sign.  For most price variables, however, the estimate from 
the simultaneous model is between the two estimates from sequential estimation, which 
suggests that the simultaneous model might provide more “reasonable” coefficients.  These 
coefficients cannot really be compared directly, however, and so we turn to elasticities. 
IV. Elasticity Comparisons  
  Bundle  choice  elasticities  are  presented  in  Table  8.    The  upper  panel  shows 
elasticities from the sequentially estimated model, but our discussion will start with the 
elasticities in the lower panel from the simultaneously estimated model.  Each entry in the 
table is not an elasticity with respect to each price in the model, as it might be difficult to 
interpret an elasticity such as the change in the probability of holding bundle 3 (two cars) 
for  a  change  in  the  price    p1  for  gas  in  the  first  car  only.    Instead,  we  calculate  the 
simultaneous effect on all choices for a change in the price of gasoline.  In the lower part 
of Table 8, the first row shows that a 1% increase in the price of gas would decrease most 
the probability of holding bundle 4 with a car and an SUV (by 0.793%) while increasing 
the share holding bundle 3 with two cars (by 0.695%).  In other words, these households 
                                                            
29 The standard deviation for  x'￿  is about 0.086 within a bundle, and for  ￿y  is about 0.78 within a bundle, 
so the finding that  ￿  has a range (-0.65,0.65) reflects a significant amount of individual heterogeneity. 
Therefore, introducing individual heterogeneity is expected to make a difference in parameter estimates.   -20- 
sell the SUV for a second car instead.  This change is driven by the high price of driving an 
SUV with low fuel efficiency.
30  In contrast, using results from the sequential method in 
the top panel, the price of gas has little effect on any bundle share. 
Given vehicle age, a higher reimbursement price  q  for Wear of a particular bundle 
means more money back to the household and thus higher probability of choosing that 
bundle.  Again, however, it is difficult to interpret a change in the price  q1  for the first car 
with no change in  q2 for the household’s second car.  Instead, we show effects of a change 
in  q  for all vehicles (or for all cars only, or all SUV’s only).  Rather than raising   q,  
policymakers may want to reduce  q  by taxing old vehicles or by subsidizing the purchase 
of a new vehicle, in order to reduce emissions.  Table 5 above shows that emissions per 
mile (EPM) are higher for SUV’s than for cars, and rise with either vehicle’s age. 
For the simultaneous model in the lower part of Table 8, the second row shows that 
a 1% tax on Wear (lower  q  for all vehicles) would decrease the probabilities of holding all 
bundles except bundle 5 (SUV, SUV).  In the next row, a tax on the age only of cars would 
decrease the reimbursement for wear on cars,  qcar,  and switch households out of cars and 
into bundle 2 with an SUV and bundle 5 with two SUV’s.  Conversely, the next row shows 
that a tax on the age only of SUV’s that lowers  qsuv  would induce a switch out of bundles 
2 and 5 with just SUV’s, and into bundles with cars.
31   
The discrete-choice-only model in the top half of the table shows results for  q  
where effects on SUV bundles are unreasonably large and sometimes the wrong sign.  A 
tax that lowers  qsuv  would encourage the purchase of two SUV’s. 
Back to the lower panel for the simultaneous model, the choice elasticities with 
respect to   y  indicate that households with more income switch from  holding no car 
(bundle 6) to one car (bundle 1), and those with a single SUV (bundle 2) seem to add a car 
(bundle 4).  Additional income reduces the share with two cars (bundle 3).  These results 
are inconsistent with the discrete-choice model, where the only bundle with a positive 
income elasticity is bundle 2 with one SUV.  
                                                            
30 This reasoning is confirmed by the choice elasticities with respect to  p1  and  p2  separately.  For bundle 4, 
a 1% higher price per mile in the car reduces the probability of choosing that bundle by 0.37%, while a 1% 
higher price per mile in the SUV (p2) reduces the probability of choosing that bundle by 0.81%.  Thus, the 
gas consumption of the SUV has twice as much impact as that of the car.  
31 This tax on age of SUV’s might actually cut emissions in two ways: by inducing a switch from SUV’s to 
cars (Table 8), and by inducing a switch from older SUV’s to newer SUV’s (Table 9 below).   -21- 
We next look at an increase in capital cost in the lower panel of Table 8.  Since this 
change effectively reduces available income, we see that each capital cost elasticity has the 
opposite sign as that bundle’s income elasticity.  With higher capital costs, households 
seem to shift primarily out of two-vehicle bundles with at least one SUV (4 and 5) into 
bundles with two cars (bundle 3) or only one SUV (bundle 2).  While it does not make 
sense to increase the capital cost only for the first car of a two-car household, it might 
make sense to increase the capital cost only of cars relative to SUV’s or vice versa (to 
represent a vehicle-type tax).  The next row of Table 8 shows that if the increase in capital 
cost pertains only to cars, then it decreases the shares of the two bundles that have only 
cars. If it pertains only to SUV’s, however, then it has large effects that decrease the shares 
of all three bundles with SUV’s.  Such a policy could clearly reduce emissions (given the 
EPM in Table 5).  The 1% higher cost of an SUV means 13.7% less of bundle 4, which 
seems too large, but it means that the share falls two percentage points (from 14.5% of all 
households in Table 6 to 12.5% of all households).  The discrete-choice-only model in the 
top part of Table 8 produces elasticities with smaller magnitudes, except that the bundle 5 
elasticity has the wrong sign (higher  ksuv  lead to more households with two SUV’s). 
The sequential model uses predictions of discrete choices to estimate continuous 
demands, for which elasticities are shown in the top half of Table 9.  These are “short run” 
elasticities, in the sense that car choices are fixed and only continuous choices like driving 
distances may change (Goldberg, 1998).
32  Again, we focus primarily on simultaneously 
estimated elasticities in the bottom panel.  In the first row, all elasticities for  VMT1  with 
respect to gasoline price are negative, as expected, for all bundles.  (For this demand, the 
sequential model produces similar results.)  The next row of Table 9 shows the effects of a 
1% increase in the reimbursement price,  q,  on Wear.  These elasticities are all positive, as 
expected:    households  choose  older  vehicles  when  they  get  higher  reimbursement  for 
holding an old vehicle.  Conversely, a tax on vehicle age that reduces  q  by 10% would 
reduce desired  Wear  by about 1.2 to 1.4% (assuming the desired cars were available).
33  
The table also shows similar effects of changing  q  just for cars, or just for SUV’s. 
Next,  consider  income  and  capital  cost  elasticities.    Due  to  the  symmetric 
specification of demand functions, a 1% change in  y  or  k  has the same effect on both 
                                                            
32 Panel data would be required to distinguish the effects of lags from contemporaneous price changes. 
33 In Table 6, the average  Wear  of 0.75 corresponds to 6.2 years of age, so a 1.2% decrease in  Wear  means 
a decrease of about one month of age.  In the sequential model, the same 10% lower  q  affects desired age of 
one-vehicle bundles by one-tenth as much, and desired ages of two-vehicle bundles by three times as much.   -22- 
VMT  and  Wear  (whether for the first vehicle or the second).  In the simultaneous model, 
income elasticities are positive as expected.  One percent more income would increase 
driving distances by about 1% to 1.5%  for all bundles.  In contrast, the sequential model 
implies income elasticities that are all negative and large (-2.6 to -4.0).  The capital cost 
elasticities are negative as expected, for both models. 
The specific form for utility in equation (4) means a specific form for demands in 
equations (5), where  ln(VMT)  and  ln(Wear)  both depend on  ￿
i
ppi – ￿qqi.  In other 
words, the parameter that determines the important effect of gas price on miles (￿
i
p) also 
necessarily  drives  the  less-important  effect  of  the  gas  price  on  choice  of    Wear.  
Similarly, the own-price effect of  q  on  Wear  also drives the cross-price effect of  q  on  
VMT.  We note this fact, but we do not mean to emphasize these cross-price elasticities. 
Finally, the last column in Table 9 reports the percentage change in total emissions 
when  each  variable  increases  by  1%.    In  the  simultaneous  model,  for  example,  a  1% 
increase in all gasoline prices would reduce total emissions by 0.136%, while a tax on age 
that reduces  q  by 1%  would reduce total emissions by 0.434%.
34  The largest elasticities 
are from income and capital cost: 1% higher income raises total emissions as expected, by 
4.246% (but in the sequential model would reduce emissions by 11.47%!)  A 1% increase 
in capital cost reduces total emissions by about 8% in either model.   
In the simultaneously estimated model, the coefficients are affected by all discrete 
and continuous choices.  The model imposes more constraints on the estimates.  Thus, if 
those constrained estimates are plugged into the likelihood function for either part of the 
sequential procedure, then the likelihood is not as high as for that portion of the sequential 
procedure.  However, the sequentially estimated model yields two sets of estimates for the 
same parameters.  The finding that these estimates are not consistent with each other raises 
questions about whether the behavioral model is correctly specified.    
V.  Conclusion 
  This paper focuses on incentive effects of price changes that might be associated 
with policies to reduce vehicle emissions.  We provide a model of household behavior that 
incorporates both the discrete choice of vehicle type, with different fuel efficiencies and 
                                                            
34 These are also short run elasticities, with no change in the number or type of vehicles.  Notice that the 
percentage change in emissions from a change in  p  is more than twice the change in driving distance, 
because the higher  p  also reduces demand for  Wear  (which also reduces emissions).  The change in  q   
also affects both  VMT  and  Wear  in the same direction, enlarging the effect on emissions.    -23- 
emission rates, and continuous demands for miles driven.  Because emission rates depend 
directly on vehicle age, we also model vehicle age as a continuous choice.  To model the 
effect of prices on the choice of vehicle age, we establish a choice of “concept vehicle” 
that is separate from the choice of  “Wear”.  Using hedonic price regressions, we quantify 
the price of  Wear.  Then, after the discrete choice among concept vehicles, both  VMT  
and  Wear  become continuous variables that enter utility. 
Yearly household data are obtained from the CEX of 1996 – 2000, supplemented 
with fuel efficiency estimates from the CARB, and gas prices from the ACCRA cost of 
living indexes.  First, like many others, we follow the sequential procedure suggested by 
Dubin and McFadden (1984).  This procedure generates two different sets of estimates for 
the same set of parameters, which we argue is inconsistent with maintained hypotheses 
about the utility function and utility maximization. We then propose and implement a 
simultaneous method for consistent estimation of both discrete and continuous choices in 
one step.  Results from the simultaneous estimation differ significantly both in signs and 
magnitude from both sets of estimates obtained by sequential estimation. 
We find that a higher price of gasoline would shift households out of the Car-SUV 
pair and into the bundle with two cars.  It also would reduce miles driven.  Both of these 
changes reduce emissions.  A tax on vehicle age would induce shifts to newer vehicles 
with less “Wear”, and would also shift families out of bundles with an SUV.  Both of these 
changes also reduce emissions.  Similarly, a tax on SUV’s would shift families into cars 
and reduce emissions.  The size of these shifts is important information for environmental 
policy.  Rather than pin down the exact size of the important parameters, however, this 
paper  points  to  important  problems  with  existing  methods  and  suggests  an  alternative 
approach with more internal consistency. 
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Table 1. Vehicle Bundle Descriptions and Statistics 














1  1  Car  --  3469  21.37  -- 
2  1  SUV  --  742  16.76  -- 
3  2  Car  Car  1181  21.88  21.55 
4  2  Car  SUV  1305  21.51  16.53 
5  2  SUV  SUV  253  17.04  16.50 
6  0  --  --  2077  --  -- 
Note: The number of households is from the consumer expenditure survey (CEX), 
and miles per gallon (MPG) is calculated from CARB data described below.   
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Table 2. Variable Definitions 
 
 
Variable  Definition 
 y   Household’s yearly expenditure 
 k   Total capital cost of a vehicle bundle  
 p1  Gas price per mile of the first vehicle 
 p2  Gas price per mile of the second vehicle 
q1  Unit price of Wear of the first vehicle 
q2  Unit price of Wear of the second vehicle 
VMT1  Miles driven in the first vehicle 
VMT2  Miles driven in the second vehicle 
Wear1  Continuous variable to measure the wear of the first vehicle 
Wear2  Continuous variable to measure the wear of the second vehicle 
Famsize  Number of members in a household 
Earnr  Number of income earners in a household 
Kids  Number of children less than 18 in a household 
Drivers  Number of household members 16 years old and over  
Metro  A dummy variable: one if the household resides inside a 
Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA), and zero otherwise 
Pop4  A dummy variable: one if the household lives in an area with a 
population of more than 4 million, and zero otherwise 
Urban  A dummy variable: one if the household lives in an urban area, 
and zero otherwise. 
Age  Age of household head 
White  A dummy variable: one if the household head is white, and 
zero otherwise 
Male  A dummy variable: one if the head is male, zero otherwise 
Educ  A dummy variable: one if the head has education higher than 
high school, zero otherwise 
Northwest  A dummy variable: one if in the Northwest, zero otherwise 
Midwest  A dummy variable: one if in the Midwest, zero otherwise 
South  A dummy variable: one if in the South, zero otherwise 
West  A dummy variable: one if in the West, zero otherwise   -28- 
Table 3. Summary of Household Statistics by Vehicle Bundles 
Number of Vehicles 
1  2  0  Characteristics 
1 (Car)  2 (SUV)  3 (C,C)  4 (C,S)  5 (S,S)  6 (none) 
# of households  3469  742  1181  1305  253  2077 
household size  1.92  2.30  2.65  2.94  3.44  1.98 
% with kids  23.87  33.56  33.62  43.98  62.45  26.05 
# of kids  0.44  0.73  0.56  0.89  1.42  0.55 
# > 15 years old  1.52  1.63  2.13  2.12  2.13  1.48 
# of workers  0.85  1.08  1.43  1.49  1.58  0.70 
% heads male  40.10  63.07  65.54  71.80  77.47  33.22 
age of head  55.24  48.22  51.84  49.45  45.24  55.66 
% heads white  82.07  87.60  83.32  89.04  92.89  67.89 
% heads educ > 
high school  52.15  52.29  66.05  57.01  57.31  34.33 
% in area with 
pop.> 4 million  28.37  19.41  30.48  22.68  18.58  38.61 
expenditures  22754.  24574.  35472.  33812.  34246.  17795. 








Table 4. Hedonic Price Regressions 
Cars  SUVs  Dependent 
Variable: cmv  Coefficient  Standard 
Error  Coefficient  Standard 
Error 
constant (a0)  1444.64  1806.08  -1220.52  2702.42 
cyl (a1)  3150.55  288.44  1993.56  411.23 
import (a2)  2371.11  894.32  1417.36  1584.27 
1-Wear (b0)  -2179.03  3272.66  8973.32  4996.71 
Wear´cyl (b1)  -3184.92  546.49  -1459.66  763.85 
Wear´import (b2)  -998.07  1719.28  -658.35  2800.80 
R
2  0.49  0.51 
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Table 5: Estimation of Miles Per Gallon (MPG) and Emissions Per Mile (EPM) 
 
Dependent Variable 
MPG  EPM 
 
Independent 
Variable  Coefficient  Standard 
Error 










cyl6 ´ car 




















































Table 6. Mean Values of Key Variables Involved in Estimation 
  Bundle 
Variable  1 (Car)  2 (SUV)  3 (C,C)  4 (C,S)  5 (S,S)  6 (none) 
% of households  38.43  8.22  13.08  14.46  2.80  23.01 
VMT1  11799.  12977.  15283.  10513.  16151.  -- 
VMT2  --  --  5554.  10771.  5358.  -- 
price of gas 1 (p1)  0.058  0.074  0.056  0.057  0.072  -- 
price of gas 2 (p2)  --  --  0.057  0.075  0.075  -- 
vintage1  8.62  8.24  7.63  7.89  6.87  -- 
vintage2  --  --  9.02  8.50  8.78  -- 
Wear1  0.76  0.73  0.72  0.73  0.68  -- 
Wear2  --  --  0.77  0.73  0.75  -- 
price of Wear1 (q1)  15572.  18010.  15363.  15686.  18052.  -- 
price of Wear2 (q2)  --  --  15301.  18133.  18105.  -- 
expenditure (y)  22754.  24574.  35472.  33812.  34246.  17795. 
capital cost (k)  17224.  20187.  34157.  37684.  40551.  -- 
capital cost 1  17224.  20187.  17125.  17337.  20232.  -- 
capital cost 2  --  --  17032.  20348.  20319.  -- 
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Table 7. Estimation Results 
Sequential Estimation 
Parameters 




p11, p31 ( 1 C a )  -0.246**  -0.460**  -0.433** 
  (0.025)  (0.070)  (0.073) 
p32  ( 2 C a )  -0.045  -0.238*  -0.045** 
  (0.033)  (0.143)  (0.008) 
p21, p51 ( 1 S a )  -0.237**  -0.927**  -0.526** 
  (0.028)  (0.054)  (0.105) 
p52 ( 2 S a )  -0.011  -0.453  -0.013 
  (0.049)  (0.380)  (0.080) 
p41 (
4
CAR a )  -0.240**  -0.374**  -0.399** 
   (0.024)  (0.143)  (0.062) 
p42 (
4
SUV a )  -0.084**  -1.331  -0.662** 
  (0.022)  (1.582)  (0.103) 
q1 ( 1 q a )  -0.012**  -0.370E-03  -0.004** 
  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.001) 
q2 ( 2 q a )  0.010**  -0.010**  -0.219E-36 
  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.936E-36) 
y (b )  -1.408**  1.134**  -0.420** 
  (0.086)  (0.134E-03)  (0.001) 
k ( 1 b )  -0.671**  -0.456**  -0.405** 
  (0.108)  (0.034)  (0.023) 
Choice specific:       
constant 2 (
2
0 a )  -1.403** 
(0.278)    0.645** 
(0.035) 
 constant 3 (
3
0 a )  4.219** 




0 a )  5.057** 




0 a )  2.401** 




0 a )  -2.045** 
(0.383)    -0.948** 
(0.132) 
Demand-Specific:       
constant 1 ( 1 V a )    9.578**  0.302** 
    (0.179)  (0.087) 
constant 2 ( 2 V a )    7.361**  0.805** 
    (0.187)  (0.088) 
constant 3 ( 1 W a )    9.346*  2.580** 
    (5.007)  (0.298) 




(continued on the next page)   -31- 
Table 7. Estimation Results (cont’d) 
Famsize  0.332  0.072**  0.058** 
  (0.542)  (0.002)  (0.001) 
Earnr  0.270**  0.067**  0.032** 
  (0.067)  (0.001)  (0.183E-03) 
Kids  0.510  0.081**  -0.031** 
  (0.527)  (0.002)  (0.001) 
Drivers  0.190  0.060**  -0.041** 
  (0.535)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Metro  -0.552**  -0.012**  0.012** 
  (0.123)  (0.002)  (0.474E-03) 
Pop4  -0.340**  -0.013**  0.012** 
  (0.085)  (0.001)  (0.290E-03) 
Urban  -0.441**  -0.058**  0.105** 
  (0.161)  (0.002)  (0.001) 
Age  0.046**  -0.007**  0.004** 
  (0.003)  (0.290E-04)  (0.128E-04) 
White  0.056  0.136**  0.097** 
  (0.091)  (0.001)  (0.386E-03) 
Male  0.057  0.109**  0.004** 
  (0.085)  (0.001)  (0.240E-03) 
Educ  0.020  0.058**  0.036** 
  (0.072)  (0.001)  (0.263E-03) 
Northwest  0.244  0.042**  0.046** 
  (0.179)  (0.001)  (0.386E-03) 
Midwest  0.401**  0.064**  0.059** 
  (0.173)  (0.001)  (0.380E-03) 
South  -0.726**  -0.150**  0.072** 
  (0.121)  (0.001)  (0.374E-03) 
1 l   0.814**    0.138** 
  (0.053)    (0.006) 
2 l   0.066**    0.103** 
  (0.003)    (0.005) 
Log Likelihood  -28917.8  -786857  -0.310E+07 
* indicates 0.10 significance level, and ** indicates 0.05 significance level. 
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Table 8. Elasticities of Discrete Choices for each Variable 
  Bundle 
Variable   1 (Car)  2 (SUV)  3 (C,C)  4 (C,S)  5 (S,S)  6 (none) 
Sequential: 
a 
 p   0.015  -0.106  0.006  -0.177E-03  0.034  -- 
q  -0.207  3.618  -0.116  -0.033  -6.077  -- 
qcar  1.530  -6.318  0.139  0.127  -3.470  -- 
qsuv  -1.737  9.937  -0.255  -0.160  -2.603  -- 
y  -0.106  0.591  -0.042  -0.006  -0.011  -0.006 
k  0.086  -0.427  0.061  0.008  -0.303  -- 
kcar  -0.008  0.127  0.056  -0.944  4.336  -- 
ksuv  0.110  -0.413  0.134  -1.099  4.703  -- 
Simultaneous: 
b 
p  0.009  -0.073  0.695  -0.793  0.020  -- 
q  0.025  0.193  0.066  0.283  -0.001  -- 
qcar  0.177  -0.966  0.151  0.352  -0.147  -- 
qsuv  -0.153  1.159  -0.085  -0.069  0.146  -- 
y  0.341  -1.203  -0.818  0.634  0.010  -0.074 
k  -0.321  0.390  1.655  -6.319  -0.377  -- 
kcar  -1.229  7.315  -13.021  7.345  1.263  -- 
ksuv  0.908  -6.925  14.676  -13.665  -1.640  -- 
a Calculation based on estimates in column 1 of Table 7. 
b Calculation based on estimates in column 3 of Table 7. 
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Table 9. Short-Run Elasticities of Continuous Demands 
  Bundle  Total 




p  -0.026  -0.066  -0.038  -0.117  -0.098  -0.211 
q  0.012  0.013  0.306  0.360  0.362  0.631 
qcar  0.012  --  0.306  0.012  --  0.368 
qsuv  --  0.013  --  0.349  0.362  0.263 
y  -2.581  -2.788  -4.024  -3.836  -3.885  -11.472 
k  -1.570  -1.840  -3.113  -3.434  -3.695  -8.746 
Simultaneous: 
b 
p  -0.024  -0.037  -0.026  -0.070  -0.038  -0.136 
q  0.122  0.141  0.120  0.123  0.141  0.434 
qcar  0.122  --  0.120  0.123  --  0.293 
qsuv  --  0.141  --  7.933E-36  0.141  0.141 
y  0.956  1.032  1.490  1.420  1.438  4.246 
k  -1.397  -1.637  -2.770  -3.056  -3.288  -7.783 
Each entry is the elasticity of  VMT  or  Wear,  in the first or second vehicle, with 
respect to each variable. 
a Calculation based on estimates in column 2 of Table 7. 
b Calculation based on estimates in column 3 of Table 7. 
c The last column is the percent change in total emissions,  E = ￿EPM´miles, 
adding over all vehicles in all bundles, for a one percent change in each variable. 
 
 
 
 